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TILTING AGAINST WINDMILLS:* A SOLIDARY REJOINDER
Alfred Henry Sampay was seriously injured while riding in a
van which was "struck from the rear by a truck driven by James E.
Davis."' Sampay filed suit against the offending driver and his
ostensible employer,2 the Morton Salt Company.' Subsequently, Sam-
pay compromised with Davis' and reserved his rights against Mor-
ton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment5 in favor of the Morton Salt Company on the
ground that the release of the employee exonerated the employer.'
Reversing, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that, in light of the
holding in Foster v. Hampton7 that an employer is solidarily liable
with a negligent employee in favor of the tort victim, "it follows
that, if the victim releases one but reserves his rights to proceed
against the other, he may do so by virtue of article 2203."' The
court specifically overruled' Williams v. Marionneaux."
The exegetical method used by the court in Sampay v. Morton
Salt Company" in interpreting Civil Code article 2203 may be
characterized as perplexing and surprising. This comment examines
the foundations for the court's decision and its potentially profound
consequences on the Louisiana law of obligations.
*With apologies to Cervantes.
1. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co:, 395 So. 2d 326, 327 (La. 1981).
2. The plaintiff alleged that Davis was employed by the Morton Salt Company at
the time of the mishap. The supreme court noted that "[wihen Sampay instituted the
instant lawsuit, he was not sure whether Davis was an employee of Morton or of Davis
Truck Service." Id at 327. However, for purposes of this phase of the litigation, the
first circuit noted: "We will assume, without deciding, that Davis was Morton's
employee." Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 388 So. 2d 62, 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
3. Civil Code article 2320 holds the employer financially responsible for his
employees' tortious conduct while acting in the course and scope of their employment.
See, e.g., Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980); Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218
So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Costa v.
Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900). See also Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Con-
tributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV. 659 (1981); Comment, Master's
Vicarious Liability for Torts Under Article 2320-A Terminological "Tar Baby," 33
LA. L. REV. 110 (1972).
4. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3071 & 3078.
5. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 966-68.
6. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 388 So. 2d 62, 63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
7. 381 So. 2d 789, 790 (La. 1980).
8. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326, 328 (La. 1981).
9. Id at 329.
10. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
11. 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981).
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Williams to Sampay: Too Swift an Evolution?
In 1960 the Louisiana Supreme Court announced the rule in
Williams v. Marionneaux that a tort plaintiff's settlement with and
release of an employee who, while acting in the course and scope of
his duties, negligently injured the plaintiff, effected a total dis-
charge of the employer, "who was only secondarily liable."1 This
12. 240 La. at 724, 124 So. 2d at 923. The court grounded its reasoning upon the
employer's indemnification right against the employee for "whatever damages he
might have been obliged to pay plaintiff for injuries .... Id Although Civil Code arti-
cle 2320, which directs the employer's responsibility, does not mention the master's
reimbursement right, the Louisiana bench consistently has sanctioned the indemnity
action. See, e.g., Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v. Marion-
neaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992
(1900); Little v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
See also Comment, The Employer's Indemnity Action, 34 LA. L. REV. 79 (1973).
Despite the ruling in Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 790 (La. 1980), that the
employer and the employee are solidarily bound in favor of the plaintiff creditor, it
seems that the master's indemnity claim should still be viable. Comment, Prescribing
Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV. 659, 701 (1981). In
fact, "Civil Code article 2106, admittedly cryptic, envisions such a situation .... Id. at
702. Morover, Justice McCaleb noted that "[tihere was but one cause of action which
the law gave plaintiff in recompense for his injuries," 240 La. at 724-25, 124 So. 2d at
923, a rule Foster did not disturb. 381 So. 2d at 790. Consequently, Williams recognized
that when the servant compromised with the plaintiff "he repaired his wrong and,
therefore, was fully acquitted from further liability." 240 La. at 725, 124 So. 2d at 923.
In addition, the court found that the acquittance inured to the benefit of Marionneaux,
the employer. Id. Spurning this reasoning, the supreme court in Sampay concluded
that because Foster v. Hampton held the employer and the employee liable as solidary
obligors, the plaintiff creditor may release the employee but still may reserve rights
against the master "by virtue of article 2203." 395 So. 2d at 328. Such a conclusion
reads too much into Foster's result. Merely categorizing two debtors as solidarily
liable does not mean that, they are bound in the same degree. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2106.
In this situation, the employee's share of the obligation is the entire debt. While Civil
Code article 2091 permits the plaintiff-creditor to demand full payment from either the
servant or the employer, the in solido classification does not in and of itself allow the
plaintiff to compromise with the employee and to retain rights against the master.
Properly read, article 2320 establishes a scheme in which the employer is required to
answer in a surety-like capacity. The employer is financially responsible to the
plaintiff-creditor, primarily to insure that the loss will be compensated should the ser-
vant prove insolvent. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916). However, in the event
that the plaintiff-creditor settles with the employee, the reason for the master's
liability ceases to exist. By contractually compromising with the employee, LA. CIv.
CODE art. 3071, the plaintiff-creditor has discharged the principal obligor, and thus the
creditor's rights should be extinguished. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2130 provides that
"[o]bligations are extinguished: . .. By voluntary remission. ... See LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2205.
Furthermore, since the plaintiff-creditor's single cause of action against both the
master and the servant, Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 790-91 (La. 1980), arose
solely from the employee's quasi-delictual behavior, the release of the employee should
operate to expunge the action; the cause of action cannot be split. LA. CODE Civ. P. art.
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result obtained despite the plaintiff's attempted reservation of his
rights against the employer and the liability insurer. Clearly setting
forth its rationale, the court reasoned that when the employee com-
promised with the plaintiff, "he repaired his wrong and, therefore,
was fully acquitted from further liability."13 Furthermore, the
release of the tortfeasor-employee inured to the benefit of the em-
ployer, since the employer's liability was merely vicarious in nature
and "derived solely from his legal relation to the wrongdoer."'"
Thus, the employer's peremptory exception of no cause of action"
was well-founded."' Additionally, Marionneaux, the employer, raised
the peremptory exception of res judicata, 17 contending that Williams'
settlement agreement with the offending employee had the force of
a thing adjudged" which barred further litigation." However,
Justice McCaleb, writing for the Williams majority, rejected this ex-
ception. Reversing the district court and the intermediate appellate
court, the supreme court concluded that the "plea of res judicata is
not tenable."' Strictly speaking, the court was correct. Civil Code
article 2286 enumerates three essential elements for the plea of res
judicata to be maintained." The thing is adjudged only when there
has been a prior suit or compromise" that involved the same par-
ties" with same object demanded. In addition, the prior action
425: "An obligee cannot divide an obligation due him for the purpose of bringing
separate actions on different portions thereof." See Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La.
713, 726, 124 So. 2d 919, 923 (1960); P. Olivier & Sons v. Board of Commissioners, 181
La. 802, 160 So. 419 (1935); Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So.
855 (1933).
13. 240 La. at 725, 124 So. 2d at 923.
14. Id.
15. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 927: "The objections which may be raised through the
peremptory exception include, but are not limited to .... (4) No cause of action ... 
16. 240 La. at 722, 124 So. 2d at 922.
17. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 927.
18. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3078: "Transactions have, between the interested parties, a
force equal to the authority of things adjudged."
19. 240 La. at 719, 124 So. 2d at 921.
20. Id.
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2286:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was
the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the demand
must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be between the
same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same quality.
22. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3078; Matthew v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 310 So. 2d 691
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Carney v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 250 So. 2d 776 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1970).
23. See, e.g., Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term- Civil Procedure, 19
LA. L. REV. 388 (1959); Comment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estop-
pel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248 (La. 1975); Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La.
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must have been based on the same juridical cause or legal theory.25
And, unfortunately, Louisiana procedure does not admit of the chief
common law preclusionary device, collateral estoppel.26 Consequently,
in Williams one of the requisites for sustaining the res judicata ex-
ception was missing: the demand was "not between the same parties
who entered into the compromise settlement which is said to have
had the force of the thing adjudged.""
The Williams decision remained undisturbed for two decades.
However, its underpinnings were shaken in 19798 and then with-
drawn in 1980 by, the supreme court. In Thomas v. W & W Clark-
lift, Inc.3" the supreme court concluded that an employer could be
76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954); Comment, Res Judicata- "Matters Which Might Have Been
Pleaded," 2 LA. L. REV. 347 (1940).
25. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976). The Mitchell court
concluded that the cause of action language in Civil Code article 2286 was an incorrect
translation. The proper translation from the French is cause, meaning legal theory. Id.
at 291. The effect of Mitchell has been described by Professor Maraist as sounding
"the death knell for estoppel by judgment (collateral estoppel) in Louisiana .... " The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term- Civil Procedure, 39
LA. L. REV. 903, 914 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1977-1978 Term-Civil Procedure].
26. See, e.g., Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978); Mitchell
v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976); Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering, Res Judicata in
Louisiana Since Hope v. Madison, 51 TUL. L. REV. 611 (1977); Kerameus, Res Judicata
A Foreign Lawyer's Impressions of Some Louisiana Problems, 35 LA. L. REV. 1151
(1975); 1977-1978 Term- Civil Procedure, supra note 25; Comment, supra note 23; Com-
ment, The Louisiana Concept of Res Judicata, 34 LA. L. REV. 763 (1974); Note, The
End of Collateral Estoppel in Louisiana Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 40
LA. L. REV. 246 (1979). Justice Dixon, writing for the majority in Welch, gave little
pause before stating that the collateral estoppel device is "a doctrine of issue preclu-
sion alien to Louisiana law." 359 So. 2d at 156. Professor Maraist. commenting on the
Welch decision, noted that the court intended to "finally and fully bury the doctrine of
collateral estoppel." 1977-1978 Term- Civil Procedure, supra note 25, at 915.
27. 240 La. at 720, 124 So. 2d at 921.
28. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979). By holding that an
employer and a third person, concurrently negligent with an employee in causing tor-
tious damage to another, may be solidary obligors, troubling questions of indemnity
and intra-debtor rights were raised. See Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Con-
tributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV, 659, 684 (1981). Since the founda-
tion for the Williams result was the supreme court's recognition of the master's
vicarious responsibility and his indemnity right, see notes 3 & 12, supra, Thomas
necessarily called Williams' fundamental tenets to task.
29. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). With Justice Watson announcing
the majority's opinion, the Foster court held that "[w]hen a servant's actions during
his employment create an unreasonable risk of harm to another, any resulting liability
is solidary with that of his master." Id. at 791 (emphasis added). While "suit against
either the employer or employee will interrupt prescription as to the other," id., the
plaintiff-creditor "has only one cause of action against both . Id See Comment,
supra note 28, at 662.
30. 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
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solidarily liable with a third person who was concurrently negligent
with the employer's servant,a" even though according to then-
governing law 2 the employer was not liable in solido with the
employee.3 The justification for refusing to hold the employer and
the servant solidarily liable in favor of the plaintiff-creditor was that
a relationship in solido is never presumed;34 it must be express.a5
Consequently, the jurisprudence 6 developed the concept of liability
in solidum, or imperfect solidarity. 7 Foster v. Hampton 8 served as
the Louisiana Supreme Court's vehicle to reverse this trend.
Although Foster noted that the relationship between the master and
servant vis-A-vis the plaintiff for the employee's quasi-offenses had
been termed imperfect solidarity, 9 the differences between perfect
and imperfect solidarity were deemed "untenable";" and the court
removed this "quirk"'" in Louisiana law by negating the authority of
31. Id. at 378.
32. Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
33. Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 213 La. 53, 60, 34 So. 2d 373, 375 (1948). The
specific question raised in Cox dealt with Civil Code article 3552. Article 3552 states
that the acknowledgment of the obligation by one solidary obligor interrupts prescrip-
tion as to all bound in solido. Examining a circumstance in which the employer was not
personally at fault, the Cox court refused to apply article 3552 in the master-servant
context with respect to the employer's answerability for the employee's torts. The
reason for the court's refusal was that the two were not solidary obligors. Id.
34. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2093.
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2093: "An obligation in solido is not presumed; it must be
expressly stipulated ......
36. See, e.g., Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972); Cox v. Shreveport
Packing Co., 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948); Cline v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La.
Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889); Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880); Britton &
Moore v. Bush, 31 La. Ann. 264 (1879); Corning & Co. v. Wood, 15 La. Ann. 168 (1860);
Hickman v. Stafford, 2 La. Ann. 792 (1847); Jacobs v. Williams, 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845);
Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974);
Granger v. General Motors Corp., 171 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Dupre v. Con-
solidated Underwriters, 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Bonacorso v. Turnley,
98 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
37. See 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE Pt. 1, nos. 777-79, at 416-17 (11th ed.
La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); J. SMITH, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS ON CON-
VENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 352 (4th ed. 1973); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for 1974-1975 Term-Obligations, 36 LA. L. REV. 375 (1976); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 280,
297 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231, 231 (1974); Comment, supra note 28, at 681;
Comment, Solidary Obligations, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217, 230 (1951).
38. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
39. Id. at 791, citing Cline v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851
(1889).
40. Id.
41. Comment, supra note 28, at 663 n.20.
1981] 1283
4LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
Cox v. Shreveport Packing Company.2 Properly read, the Foster v.
Hampton holding is precise: the employer and employee are solidarily
bound in favor of the tort-plaintiff injured through the employee's
negligence. 8 Writing for the majority in Foster, Justice Watson
specifically pointed out that the master and the servant are not
joint tort-feasors and that the plaintiff-creditor has but one cause of
action." Still, "characterizing debtors as solidarily bound, without
limiting the effects of the label to those required to benefit the
creditor, portends serious consequences" 5 for future cases.
Classifying the employer as liable in solido with the employee
seriously disturbed the Williams v. Marionneaux" idea that the
master's responsibility under Civil Code article 2320 was secondary
or accessory in all instances in which the master himself was not at
fault. 7 The evolution from Cox v. Shreveport Packing Company"
and Williams to Foster v. Hampton" was certainly dramatic.
Perhaps it was too sudden, for concepts long internalized were aban-
doned" without certainty as to what might follow. For example,
once the supreme court concluded that imperfect solidarity had no
basis in legislation"' and was to be dismissed, 2 the inevitable ques-
tion is whether all solidary obligors are really bound in solido. In
other words, a rejection of the doctrine of imperfect solidarity could
42. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
43. 381 So. 2d at 790.
44. Id. See note 12, supra.
45. Comment, supra note 28, at 684.
46. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
47. 240 La. at 723-25, 124 So. 2d at 922-23.
48. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
49. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
50. Although Foster overruled Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co. with respect to
master-servant solidarity, at least for prescriptive purposes, see LA. Civ. CODE art.
2097, Cox was not recognized to have been incorrect in classifying the employer's re-
sponsibility as statutory in origin. The master's answerability is dictated by Civil Code
article 2320 by virtue of the contractual relationship with the employee. 381 So. 2d at
790. If that is the case, then the cause for the employer's obligation is different from
the reason for the servant's liability. According to traditional doctrine, C. AUBRY & C.
RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 298b, at 20-21 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965), such solidar-
ity could not be perfect or correality. If properly classified as an in solido relationship,
simple or imperfect solidarity would be the appropriate name. Yet, when Foster re-
jected as unwarranted the distinctions between perfect and imperfect solidarity, 381
So. 2d at 790, the supreme court ruled that what had been termed previously im-
perfect solidarity might be perfect solidarity. This action was taken without providing
an explanation of the dramatic consequences which might follow.
51. "IT]here is no legislative ground for the distinction drawn between perfect and
imperfect solidarity." Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980), citing Wooten
v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 307 (La. 1972) (Tate, J., concurring).
52. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980).
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mean that all debtors carrying the in solido label were bound equally
for virile shares. Yet, the Foster court could not have intended such
a notion. Civil Code articles 2103"' and 2106 envision that some
solidary debtors may owe more than a proportionate share.' Civil
Code article 2106 provides that if the situation in which the solidary
obligation has been incurred concerns "only one of the cobbligors in
solido, that one is liable for the whole debt towards the other codeb-
tors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his securities
[sureties]."'5
Sampay-A Simplistic Solution
After "initial pretrial sparring,"" Alfred Sampay settled his
claims with the assumed employee57 of the Morton Salt Company but
reserved his rights against Morton. When the case reached the
supreme court, Chief Justice Dixon succinctly framed the issue pre-
sented: "whether a plaintiff may, after settling with the tortfeasor
and reserving his rights, proceed against the torfeasor's employer." 8
Noting that the Williams decision had relied upon Cox v. Shreveport
Packing Company, the Sampay court pointed out that Cox's tenure
had been stormy; it had been criticized59 and expressly overruled."
In contrast, Williams was recognized as perceptive "in characteriz-
ing the employee's liability as primary and the employer's liability
as secondary or derivative."'" The employer's responsibility is solely
53. Civil Code article 2103 treats the matter of debtors sharing liability among
each other. Once the creditor, who may demand the whole of the debt from any one
solidary obligor, LA. CiV. CODE art. 2091, has been paid, the debtors may institute con-
tribution claims. "If the obligation arises from a contract or a quasi-contract, each deb-
tor is liable for his virile portion." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103 (emphasis added). By con-
trast, "[ijf the obligation arises from an offense or quasi-offense, it shall be divided in
proportion to each debtor's fault." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2103 (emphasis added).
54. In the employer-employee situation it seems that the master's "fault" is merely
constructive or non-existent. Consequently, the technically liable obligor may be reim-
bursed by the actual wrongdoer-the tortious actor. See Appalachian Corp., Inc. v.
Brooklyn Cooperage Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922); Sutton v. Champagne, 141
La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917). Obviously, the employer's share of the debt is not identical
to the servant's portion.
55. (Emphasis added).
56. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 388 So. 2d 62, 63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
57. See note 2, supra.
58. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326, 327 (La. 1981).
59. Concurring in Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 307 (Tate, J., concurring),
Justice Tate viewed Cox as a "misinterpretation in 1948," id. at 308, which "may be
excused by the dearth then of translated doctrinal explanations of the reason for the
Article . . . [Civil Code article 20931 and its function in our code." Id.
60. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980).
61. 395 So. 2d at 327.
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a function of the employment contract. 2 Nevertheless, the court
wrote that "[tihe terms primary and secondary ... can be mislead-
ing. The employer's situation is not analogous to that of the simple
surety, for unlike the simple surety, the employer does not have the
benefit of discussion."6" Analyzing this statement is difficult; it is
uncertain why the Sampay majority mentioned simple suretyship.
The employer has been likened to a surety"4 since the master is an-
swerable to the plaintiff merely by virtue of an accessory relation-
ship. 5 But, it is clear that the employer is not a simple surety, since
Foster v. Hampton66 held that the employer and the employee are
solidary obligors for the creditor's benefit. 7 Rather, the employer is
very much like a solidary surety; and, by analogy, Civil Code article
3045 is applicable. Article 3045 clearly states that should the surety
be bound in solido with the debtor, "the effects of his engagement
are to be regulated by the same principles which have been es-
tablished for debtors in solido."6 6 Paramount in the rules governing
solidary obligors 9 is the principle that when the obligors "are all
obliged to the same thing, . . . each may be compelled for the
whole."7 In view of Civil Code article 2091, the solidary surety
necessarily has waived the plea of discussion."' With respect to the
62. "[I]t is a consequence of the employment relationship." Id at 328.
63. Id.
64. Comment, supra note 28, at 703 & n.287.
65. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320; Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326, 327
(La. 1981); Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 790 (La. 1980); Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La.
483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960);
Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900); Brannan, Patterson & Holiday v. Hoel,
15 La. Ann. 308 (1860); LeBlanc v. Roy Young, Inc., 308 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 240 (La. 1975); Johnson v. Dabbs, 194 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1967); Little v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
66. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
67. Id. at 791.
68. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3045.
69. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2088-107.
70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
71. Civil Code article 2094 is particularly germane: "The creditor of an obligation
contracted in solido may apply to any one of the debtors he pleases, without the deb-
tors' having a right to plead the benefit of division." See Central Bank v. Winn
Farmers Co-Operative, 299 So. 2d 442 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974). Reading article 3045's
reference to the rules of solidarity as negating the benefit of discussion to the solidary
surety in conjunction with article 2104, denying the plea of division in instances of
multiple solidary sureties, seems to be appropriate. "The solidary surety waives the
pleas of discussion and division." Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte, 309
So. 2d 274, 278 (La. 1975), citing La. Civ. Code art. 3045; Brock v. First State Bank &
Trust Co., 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937); Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of
Cancienne, 140 La. 969, 74 So. 267 (1917); Home Ins. Co. v. Voorhies Co., 168 So. 724
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1936); 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 2352
(Vol. 411286
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employer who is a personal security imposed by law,72 the plea of
discussion is unavailable, since the master may be compelled to
satisfy the whole of the solidary debt.
In addition, the Sampay court read article 2203 as permitting
the tort plaintiff to compromise with and release the employee and
still reserve rights against the employer. 71 Civil Code article 2203
allows a creditor to discharge conventionally one of the solidary
codebtors and to reserve expressly rights against the debtor or deb-
tors not released.74 But the court failed to consider the second
paragraph of article 2203, which precludes the creditor from claim-
ing the obligation from the debtors not released "without making a
deduction of the part of him to whom he has made the remission."75
Instead, Chief Justice Dixon concluded that when "the creditor re-
serves his rights to proceed against the other solidary obligors....
the release does not inure to the benefit of the other solidary
obligors. 7 1 With all deference, the court could not have intended to
erase effectively from the Civil Code the second paragraph of article
2203. The creditor's remittance in favor of one solidary obligor must
operate in favor of the other solidary debtors. In this situation, the
solidary debt is at issue and not the number of obligors. The
creditor has reduced the single obligation in the amount of the part
owed by the released debtor. 77 Consequently, the obligee has no
right to demand from the other debtors more than the remaining
part. If that is the case, as the Civil Code seems to provide, then the
appropriate determination is what part of the debt the remaining
obligors owe. Again, the Civil Code provides an answer. Article 2106
indicates that the principal debtor-employee's part is all of the debt.
Thus, the employer, as a secondary or accessory obligor akin to a
surety, owes nothing if the principal has been released."
(La. St. L. Inst. Trans. 1959). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Security Devices 36 LA. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as 1974-1975-Security Devices].
72. See note 12, supra, and accompanying text.
73. 395 So. 2d at 328.
74. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203. One problem with applying article 2203 to any prin-
cipal debtor-surety situation is that the article appears to anticipate perfectly bound,
solidary obligors since ratable shares seem to be presumed. When classic in solidum
debtors are involved the principles of article 2203 are confounding. After all, what part
of the debt is attributable to the accessory debtor? The Sampay confusion is not one of
first impression, however. See Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte, 309
So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
75. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203 (emphasis added).
76. 395 So. 2d at 328.
77. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2205.
78. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2205: "The remission or even conventional discharge
granted to a principal debtor, discharges the sureties." (Emphasis added).
1981] 1287
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Apparently, without consideration of the interplay between Civil
Code articles 2106, 2203, and 2205, the supreme court announced
that "[bly reserving his rights, the creditor makes clear that he is
not fully compensated and that he will proceed against the other
solidary obligors." 9 Factually, this may be the case, but zealous pur-
suit of a claim by the plaintiff-creditor should not expand the rights
which the positive law grants." The Sampay court concluded that
"[b]ecause Foster v. Hampton . . . recognized that the employee and
the employer are solidary obligors, it follows that, if the victim
releases one but reserves his rights to proceed against the other, he
may do so by virtue of article 2203."' 1
Unless it is presumed that the employer and the employee are
bound for virile shares vis-i-vis the creditor, it does not follow that
Civil Code article 2203 authorizes the tort victim to release the prin-
cipal debtor and then to reserve the right to proceed against the
employer. In that event, the plaintiff-creditor may release the em-
ployee and reserve his rights against the master for one-half of the
obligation. Perhaps the Sampay majority's Foster v. Hampton cita-
tion is telling in this regard. If the Foster court did mean to
obliterate all distinctions between perfect and imperfect solidarity,
at least with respect to the plaintiff creditor, 2 then the application
of the concept of virile shares to the employer and employee is con-
sistent. The argument might be advanced that after Foster, the
supreme court will interpret the Civil Code to provide only one type
of solidarity favoring creditors -perfect solidarity. Then the Code
articles providing that not all solidary obligors are liable for the
same amount" may operate "only in relation to the ultimate alloca-
tion of the obligation between the employer and the employee."8'
Bolstering this reading of Sampay, Chief Justice Dixon wrote that
"[firom the viewpoint of the victim, the employer and the employee
are solidary obligors."'85
The judicial approach of treating the answerable employer, who
is basically a surety, as a principle obligor in calculating the portion
of the debt remitted for article 2203 purposes, while inferring that
79. 395 So. 2d at 328.
80. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1, 13 & 17.
81. 395 So. 2dat 328.
82. Chief Justice Dixon intimated that the Sampay decision may not affect the
employer's reimbursement action once the plaintiff-creditor is satisfied fully. He
reasoned: "That the employer's liability is vicarious is important only in relation to the
ultimate allocation of the obligation between the employer and the employee." Id. at
329 (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2103 & 2106.
84. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326, 329 (La. 1981).
85. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
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different rules might govern the final adjustment of rights among the
solidary debtors, is not novel." With Justice Dixon writing for the
majority, the supreme court in Louisiana Bank and Trust Company,
Crowley v. Boutte"7 held that a compromise and release of the prin-
cipal debtor when the creditor reserved rights against a surety did
not discharge a surety bound in solido with the principal obligor.8
The court's rationale was that the surety's obligation to the creditor
was controlled by the Civil Code rules of solidarity. 9 It is unfor-
tunate that the court regarded an in solido classification as a passkey
for ruling that all debtors are bound for ratable shares. The court
overlooked the fundamental distinction between principal obligors
and accesory debtors. By virtue of the accessory nature of his obli-
gation," the surety has stated both that the principal debt is not his
affair9 and that his obligation is contingent upon the principal's
failure to perform."2 Similarly, the employer answers for the tor-
tious damage caused by the employee's negligence in the course and
scope of the employment, not because of participation in the wrong,
but simply for the reason that article 2320 requires it.9
Although Boutte has been uniformly criticized," it still ar-
ticulates the present law of solidary suretyship in the creditor vis-i-
vis solidary debtors context.9 As significant a decision as Boutte
86. See Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La.
1975).
87. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975). See Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Security
Devices, 41 LA. L. REV. 389, 390 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1979-1980-Security
Devices]; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979
Ter-n-Security Devices, 40 LA. L. REV. 572, 572 (1980); 1974-1975 Term-Security
Devices, supra note 71: Note, Green Garden: Short Shrift for the Solidary Surety, 41
LA. L. REV. 968 (1981); Note, Aiavolasiti: A Conflict Resolved, a Conflict Ignored, 40
LA. L. REV. 483 (1980); Note, Rights of the Solidary Surety: Louisiana Bank & Trust
Co. v. Boutte, 36 LA. L. REV. 279 (1975); Note; Security Rights-Suretyship-Release
of Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge Solidary Surety, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
88. Succinctly the court held that "the compromise and release of the principal deb-
tor ... did not operate to release the solidary surety ...." 309 So. 2d at 279.
89. "[Als between the creditor and the solidary surety, the obligations of the surety
are governed by the rules of solidary obligors." Id. at 278.
90. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1771, 2205 & 3035.
91. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2106.
92. The employer, standing as a surety for the tortious servant, has liability that
should be contingent in that if the plaintiff-creditor no longer has an action against the
employee, the employer should not be required to respond. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2205.
93. Comment, supra note 28, at 689-90.
94. See 1974-1975 Term-Security Devices, supra note 71; Note, Rights of the
Solidary Surety: Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 36 LA. L. REV. 279 (1975);
Note, Security Rights-Suretyship-Release of Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge
Solidary Surety, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
95. "In Louisiana Bank And Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte ... this court.., held
that the effect of the application of articles 2106 and 3045 of the Civil Code is that, as
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was, and remains today, if Sampay withstands future challenges, its
impact will be even more monumental. The Boutte court interpreted
only one suretyship contract, albeit one in prevalent use." The deci-
sion is a determination of contractual intent and language,97 and the
terms of the suretyship contract may be varied" if the parties
desire to avoid a Boutte-type judicial interpretation. By contrast,
the Sampay decision is a matter of law for obligations arising from
the fact" of the employee's negligence. Hence, the difficult problems
that Sampay raises will confront the bench and bar with little flex-
ibility. A sampling of the problems raised by Sampay and sugges-
tions for working within the bounds of the court's decision are of-
fered.
Res Judicata- Wooten Again?
One need not be overly imaginative to read Foster v. Hampton
and Sampay v. Morton Salt Company as reviving the baffling prob-
lems presented in Wooten v. Wimberly.1 ° In Wooten, the plaintiff's
son allegedly was injured by the negligence of another minor,
Howard Wimberly, Jr.10' Suit was filed against the boy's father, but
Howard Wimberly, Jr. was not named as a defendant. 12 The district
court ruled that young Wimberly was not at fault and denied re-
between the creditor and the surety bound in solido with the debtor, the obligations of
the surety are governed by the rules of solidary obligors." Aiavolasiti v. Versailles
Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 755, 758 (La. 1979) (citation omitted) (footnotes omit-
ted).
96. Nearly identical suretyship contracts were in dispute in three recent supreme
court decisions: First Nat'l Bank of Crowley v. Green Garden Processing Co., Inc., 387
So. 2d 1070 (La. 1980); Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755,
758 (La. 1979); Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La.
1975).
97. Writing for the Aiavolasiti court, Justice Dennis noted the fundamental
nature of the suretyship agreement-it is a contract. Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens
Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755, 758 (La. 1979). See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3035 (suretyship
is an accessory contract); 1979-1980-Security Devices, supra note 87.
98. See Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755, 758 (La.
1979); Note, Aiavolasiti: A Conflict Resolved, A Conflict Ignored, 40 LA. L. REV. 483
(1980).
99. Articles 2315 through 2324 of the Civil Code provide the principles for categoriz-
ing delictual and quasi-delictual obligations. Fault is the fundamental standard; a tort-
feasor is liable for the injury he has caused through his fault. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2315.
Since the tortious conduct is a matter of fact, the obligation is legally imposed. LA.
CIv. CODE arts. 1760 & 2292.
100. 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972). See 1972-1973 Term, supra note 37; Note, The Non-
solidness of Solidarity, 34 LA. L. REV. 648 (1974); Note, Parent and Child Not Bound in
solido for the Minor's Tort?, 19 LoY. L. REV. 758 (1973).
101. 272 So. 2d at 304.
102. Id.
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covery against his father. Subsequently, the third circuit affirmed"3
and the supreme court denied certiorari."' Prior to the supreme
court's writ refusal, the plaintiff commenced a second suit against
Howard Wimberly, Jr., who had attained majority during the course
of the first litigation. 5 Ultimately, the supreme court held that the
plaintiff's claim had prescribed,"' since the father and the son were
not solidary obligors under Civil Code article 2318, and since the in-
itial suit did not operate to interrupt prescription as to young
Wimberly. 7 The fundamental objection to the second suit was "that
it was an attempt at relitigation of the identical issue already decid-
ed adversely to the plaintiff: was there actionable negligence on the
part of the minor?"'0 8 Concurring in the court's decision, Justice
Tate noted that "the plaintiff should not twice vex the court system
and the same family and liability insurer with the identical claim."' '
Certainly Justice Tate was correct. But Wooten's premise for barr-
ing the second claim no longer seems to exist. The Wooten majority
had relied specifically on Cox v. Shreveport Packing Company,"'
which was overturned in Foster."' Although the Louisiana Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the question, there seems little reason
to doubt that it will hold the parent and child solidarily bound for
the damage caused by the minor's negligence, just as in the master-
servant situation.
2
Exactly what consequences may follow from the implications of
Sampay is uncertain. Perhaps a plaintiff-creditor, alleging injury at
the hands of a negligent employee or minor, could file suit against
the master or parent, try the case and lose, yet still be able to sue
the employee or minor."0 Or the converse might be possible, given
103. Wooten v. Wimberly, 233 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
104. Wooten v. Wimberly, 256 La. 359, 236 So. 2d 496 (1970).
105. 272 So. 2d at 304.
106. Civil Code article 3536 provides that actions for damages "resulting from of-
fenses or quasi offenses" are prescribed by one year's lapse.
107. "[Tihe father in this instance was not a solidary co-debtor with his minor son
for the alleged tortious conduct of the son." Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 307
(La. 1972).
108. 1972-1973 Term, supra note 37, at 232.
109. 272 So. 2d at 310 (Tate, J., concurring).
110. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
111. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980).
112. Comment, supra note 28, at 709.
113. Procedurally, an unemancipated minor lacks the capacity to be sued. Instead,
"[t]he father, as administrator of the estate of his minor child, is the proper defendant
in an action to enforce an obligation against an unemancipated minor .... " LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 732. Strange as it may seem, Sampay could permit a suit against a father
in his capacity as administrator of his child's estate on a cause of action arising from
the alleged negligence of the minor even though a previous suit against the father per-
sonally had been defeated.
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that suit against one solidary obligor interrupts prescription as to
all so classified;"' thus, the peremptory exception of prescription"'
could not be raised successfully. Nor is collateral estoppel
available."' Strictly speaking, res judicatal 7 could not be pleaded;",
however, the second defendant could argue that the plaintiff imper-
missibly divided his cause of action. 19
In view of the Sampay court's overruling20 of Williams v.
Marionneaux,"' Wooten's "parade of horribles"'11 may have been
granted full license. Inconsistent results probably will plague the
courts for some time. And, if inconsistent decisions obtain in what
should be the same lawsuit, insoluble practical problems arise. For
example, suppose A is injured through the alleged negligence of X,
an employee acting in the course and scope of his duties for Z. If A
sues X in a negligence action, loses in the trial court, and allows ap-
peal delays to pass,'23 a final and definitive judgment has been
rendered in X's favor. Yet, since A's suit against X interrupted
prescription against Z,"1' who is a potential solidary obligor with X,
A might be allowed to commence proceedings again. Williams would
not have allowed this scenario,"5 but Williams is no longer author-
114. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097.
115. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 927.
116. Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978); Mitchell v. Ber-
tolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976).
117. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 927.
118. The triple identities test of Civil Code article 2286 would not be satisfied; the
defendant parties differ in the two suits. See, e.g., Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
Dissenting in Wooten, Justice Barham rebutted the conclusion that the res judicata
peremptory exception would be inapplicable. 272 So. 2d at 311-12 (Barham, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Barham postulated that "[a] suit against one bound solidarily for the debt
with another satisfies the requirements of a plea of res judicata under Civil Code Arti-
cle 2286." Id. at 312. He reasoned that "[tlhe demand is the same, the demand is founded
on the same cause of action, and the demand is between the same parties, for as to the
plaintiff in a suit on a solidary debt one solidary obligor is the same as the other
solidary obligor." Id.
119. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 425. See Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14
(1954).
120. 395 So. 2d at 329.
121. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
122. "Credit for promulgating this phrase has been given to Thomas Reed Powell.
Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1305 & n.26 (1960). It is a
venerable technique, and a good one for evaluating the possible effects of actions
which may be irreversible." Comment, Rescinding Ratification of Proposed Constitu-
tional Amendments-A Question for the Court, 37 LA. L. REV. 896, 925 n.169 (1977).
123. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2087 & 2123.
124. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097.
125. 240 La. at 726-27, 124 So. 2d at 923-24.
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itative. Moreover, if A is successful against Z in his claim that X's
negligence caused his damages, then Z should be allowed full indem-
nification from X for any amount paid to A." If so, Xs prior judicial
absolution is -defeated.
Difficulties arising from settlement agreements after Sampay
may affect the fundamental notions of principal and accessory obli-
gations expressed in the Civil Code." 7 If the employee, whose as-
serted negligence is claimed to have caused the plaintiff-creditor's
damage, settles and compromises, two issues are resolved. First, the
employee has admitted his wrong, and if it was done in the course
and scope of the employment relation, the master will be answer-
able. Second, the amount of the primary obligation is established;
and the accessory obligation cannot be more onerous.'
Herein lies the fallacy of the Sampay decision. Neither the
employer, under article 2320, nor the parent, under article 2318,
owes a debt separate and distinct from that of the principal-the ac-
tual tortfeasor. Once the plaintiff-creditor perfects a compromise
with the principal debtor, his action vanishes; he is unable to
reserve any rights against the accessory.'3" The underlying cause of
action is merged into the conventional obligation to pay as resolved
126. See, e.g., Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v.
Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 125 So. 2d 919 (1960); Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So.
992 (1900); Brannan, Patterson & Holiday v. Hoel, 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860); LeBlanc v.
Roy Young, Inc., 308 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 240 (La.
1975); Johnson v. Dabbs, 194 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Little v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Comment, The Employer's
Indemnity Action, 34 LA. L. REV. 79 (1973). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 2106 & 3052.
127. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1771.
128. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320. Of course, the master will be allowed to litigate the
question whether the employee was operating within the scope of the employment
relationship. Since the employer is not a party to the compromise agreement, due pro-
cess considerations prohibit his rights from being prejudiced to the extent the
employee "admits" to acting in the course of his duties. The qualification of the
employer's liability upon the premise that the employee's tort must have been commit-
ted pursuant to employment authorized activity is akin to the notion that the surety's
liability extends only as to those obligations which he agreed to guarantee. If the
creditor demands from the surety payment for a debt that the surety did not contract
to secure, the surety is not liable. See Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Sherman, 7 So. 2d
433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
129. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3037: "The suretyship can not exceed what may be due
by the debtor, nor be contracted under more onerous conditions."
130. This author believes that Justice McCaleb stated the correct rule in Williams
v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 726-27, 124 So. 2d 919, 924 (1960): "[flurthermore, for the
reasons above stated, we do not regard the reservation of his rights against Marion-
neaux [the employer] contained in the release to be effective. Indeed, since the com-
promise had the legal effect of discharging Marionneaux, plaintiff's reservation of
rights against Marionneaux in the release amounted to naught ...." (Emphasis added.)
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in the compromise agreement."' For this amount, the employer or
the parent, provided that articles 2320 or 2318, respectively, are ap-
plicable, can be required to answer. But not for more.
Conclusion
Sampay v. Morton Salt Company indicates that the Louisiana
Supreme Court will presume that all debtors owe virile shares once
it has been concluded that they are bound in solido. However, this
characterization appears to be applicable only from the creditor's
perspective.'8 2 Intra-debtor actions ultimately may prove that the
obligors are not liable proportionately.' If this is an accurate
reading of Sampay, great damage has been done to the Civil Code.
Sampay considers accessory obligors as principals. In addition, the
court seems adamant in refusing to examine the reason or cause for
the accessory's responsibility. Thus, an employer, made to answer
for the quasi-delicts of a servant merely by virtue of the employ-
ment relationship, should not be compelled to respond when the em-
ployee's debt, the principal obligation, is terminated. Deceptively
simple, the rule that the release of the principal operates to dis-
charge the accessory is basic to Louisiana law" 4-notwithstanding
classification of the principal and accessory as obligors in solido. In-
sofar as Sampay strays from this statutory premise which
distinguishes between primary and secondary obligors, a judicial re-
evaluation is suggested."3 '
Bruce V. Schewe
131. Cf Morrison v. Faulk, 158 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (obligation of
lessee to pay rent in accordance with the lease merged into judgment ruling the lessee
liable for rental due on unexpired term of the lease).
132. See notes 83-85, supra, and accompanying text,
133. See notes 53-54, supra, and accompanying text.
134. See notes 90-92, supra, and accompanying text.
135. In any event, it may be that the comparative fault scheme introduced in Loui-
siana by Act 431 of 1979 negates the court's presumption viewing all solidary obligors
as liable for virile shares. Civil Code article 2103 notes that the proper division of a
solidary obligation arising from a quasi-delicit is "in proportion to each debtor's fault."
Furthermore, one of the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure indicates that a
jury is to return special verdicts listing the percentage of each obligor's fault. LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 1811(B):
In cases to recover damages for injury, death or loss, the court shall submit to the
jury special written questions inquiring as to:
1. Whether a party from whom damages are claimed, or the person for whom
such party is legally responsible, was at fault, and, if so:
(a) Whether such fault was a proximate cause of the damages, and, if so:
(b) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage ....
(Emphasis added).
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